Does the Attorney General have authority to argue that the trial court intended to impose a consecutive sentence on count 11?

In support of the argument that the trial court intended to impose a consecutive sentence on count 11, the Attorney General observes: (1) the trial court imposed consecutive terms for the other counts, (2) the trial court said that the presentence custody credits would be credited to the county jail term, and (3) both the minute order and the abstract of judgment reflect a consecutive term. But the Attorney General offers no authority for the argument, and in any event, the trial court's intent is irrelevant. The question is whether the trial court actually imposed a consecutive term, which it did not. The trial court's failure to designate the misdemeanor term associated with count 11 as a consecutive term means the term is concurrent. ( 669, subd. (b); People v. Rogers, supra, 252 Cal.App.2d at p. 1020.)

The argument that defendant forfeited this contention also lacks merit. Because the trial court imposed a concurrent term by operation of law, the contrary indications in the minute order and abstract of judgment are clerical errors that must be corrected. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)

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Defendant further contends he is entitled to additional presentence credit. The Attorney General agrees, and so do we.