Does reckless use of force constitute a crime of violence?

In Fernandez-Ruiz, we joined several other circuits in holding that the reasoning of Leocal means that crimes involving the reckless use of force do not qualify under 16 as a crime of violence. 466 F.3d at 1129. There we held that neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under 16. Id. at 1130. We have since interpreted the en banc decision in Fernandez-Ruiz to mean that reckless use of force is not sufficient to support a finding of commission of a crime of violence within the meaning of 16(b). Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir.2007). The effect of our holdings is that in order to be a predicate offense under either 18 U.S.C. 16 approach, the underlying offense must require proof of an intentional use of force or a substantial risk that force will be intentionally used during its commission. United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 787 (9th Cir.2008). Thus our precedent seems squarely to place crimes motivated by intent on a pedestal, while pushing off other very dangerous and violent conduct that, because not intentional, does not qualify as a crime of violence.

Covarrubias was convicted of CPC 246, which provides: