Does a defendant have standing to complain about a violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?

Although a defendant lacks standing to complain about a violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a defendant does have standing to assert that a violation occurred of his or her own due process right to a fair trial because of an asserted violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment right. (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) [D]efendant can prevail on his suppression claim only if he can show that the trial testimony given by [the third party] was involuntary at the time it was given. (Id. at 347, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) The purpose of exclusion of evidence pursuant to a due process claim such as defendants' is adequately served by focusing on the evidence to be presented at trial, and asking whether that evidence is made unreliable by ongoing coercion, rather than assuming that pressures that may have been brought to bear at an earlier point ordinarily will taint the witness's testimony. (Id. at pp. 347348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) Thus, it is not enough for a defendant who seeks to exclude trial testimony of a third party to allege that coercion was applied against the third party, producing an involuntary statement before trial. In order to state a claim of violation of his own due process rights, a defendant must also allege that the pretrial coercion was such that it would actually affect the reliability of the evidence to be presented at trial. (Id. at p. 348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, fn. omitted.)