Does a defendant have standing to complain of a violation of third party's privilege against self-incrimination?

A criminal defendant has a right upon request to have the jury instructed to draw no inference from the exercise of the defendant's constitutional right not to testify. (People v. Lopez (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1535.) However, a defendant lacks standing to complain of a violation of a third party's privilege against self-incrimination unless the circumstances amount to a violation of the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 965-966.) "The violation of a third party's privilege against self-incrimination may deprive a defendant of his or her due process rights if such action adversely affects the reliability of testimony offered against the defendant at trial." (Id. at p. 966.) " 'When a defendant seeks to exclude evidence on this ground, the defendant must allege that the trial testimony is coerced [citation], and that its admission will deprive him of a fair trial [citation].' " (Ibid.) The concern for fairness is whether the violation was so coercive as to make the resulting trial evidence unreliable. (Id. at pp. 966-967.)