Can a jury rely on reliance on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to support a first degree murder conviction?

The jury instructions did not preclude reliance on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to support a first degree murder conviction. A jury must follow the instructions of the trial court, but it is not equally bound by the arguments of counsel. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 114, fn. 14.) While the instruction on natural and probable consequences permitted the jury to conclude that murder was a natural and probable consequence of assault or disturbing the peace, the instruction did not give the jury guidance on the degree of murder. The instruction did not limit the application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to second degree murder. Therefore, although the prosecutor's argument suggested limiting the application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to second degree murder, it remained possible for the jury, following the trial court's instructions, to convict Hoong of first degree murder predicated upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Certainly we may consider the arguments of counsel when determining whether an omission in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 59 [failure to instruct jury that attempted murder requires intent to kill cured by prosecutor's argument].) However, in this case, the defect in the jury instructions (the failure to limit the natural and probable consequences doctrine to second degree murder) was not the only circumstance that casts doubt on whether the error was harmless. And this was not merely an omission; instead, the jury instructions expressly allowed the jury to take an improper path to convicting Hoong of first degree murder.