Can a jury interpret an instruction indicating that a defendant's pre-trial statement was a means by which the prosecution could prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt?

Defendant cites Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307 [85 L.Ed.2d 344], in support of his argument that the jurors could have interpreted the instruction as indicating his pretrial statement was a means by which the prosecution could prove his identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. However, Francis v. Franklin involved an instruction setting up a mandatory rebuttable presumption found to have created an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption regarding intent. (Id. at p. 316.) Here, the challenged portion of the instruction involved a permissible finding, not a presumption, and it would be permissible to rely on extrajudicial admissions to prove identity once the corpus delecti has been established.

We conclude there was no instructional error regarding identity.