When will a defendant not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a penalty case?

Defendant further argues that the decision whether to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt is one made by weighing the social interests at stake. Among the many examples he cites are In re Winship

[135 Cal.Rptr.2d 400]

(1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (juvenile court adjudication) and People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373 (commitment as mentally disordered sex offender). All of the cases cited, however, involve an adjudication of guilt or status. Such adjudications are analogous to the guilt phase determination in a capital trial, which is governed by the reasonable doubt standard.

[135 Cal.Rptr.2d 400]

The penalty decision, on the other hand, is the counterpart of judicial sentencing in a noncapital case. A trial judge imposing a sentence has never been required to believe that the considerations on which it is based have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, whether or not the sentencing decision involves issues of great social interest. To the contrary, in imposing a sentence the judge may consider actions and offenses that have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Gragg (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 32, 44-45, 264 Cal.Rptr. 765.) The requirement that prior criminal conduct asserted as an aggravating consideration under factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3 be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is imposed by statute, not by the state or federal Constitution. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.)