When assessing whether a second competency hearing is required for a defendant to stand trial, what is the current state of the law on the basis of this?

"[W]hen . . . a competency hearing has already been held, the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether there has been some significant change in the defendant's mental state." (People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153; see also Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 890 [noting that "the trial court was in a position to determine from its own observations ever since the preliminary examination, including presiding over the competency proceedings, that the proffered new evidence of defendant's incompetence during trial, including his weeping,

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irrationality, and the reported lack of engagement in his own defense, were not indicators of a change but were consistent with behaviors and the evidence of incompetence that had been considered at the competency trial"].) "[T]he duty to suspend is not triggered by information that substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant's competence; when faced with evidence of relatively minor changes in the defendant's mental state, the court may rely on a prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing to cover largely the same ground." (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 234-235.) When assessing whether a second competency hearing is required, "[m]ore is required than just bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of competency." (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33.)

When the trial court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, it has no discretion to exercise, and it must, as a matter of law, initiate proceedings to determine whether the defendant is currently competent to stand trial. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033 [trial court has discretion to decide against a competency hearing only "absent a showing of 'incompetence' that is 'substantial' as a matter of law"]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 738 ["once the accused has come forward with substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial" the trial judge "has no discretion to exercise"].)

"On review, our inquiry is focused not on the subjective opinion of the trial judge, but rather on whether there was substantial evidence raising a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial." (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 195.) Therefore, the question before us is whether there was any new evidence or change of circumstance presented to the trial court constituting substantial evidence of

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