The following excerpt is from United States v. Alhaggagi, 978 F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 2020):
The term "federal crime of terrorism" is defined as "an offense that is ... calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct," 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(A), and that "is a violation of" certain enumerated statutes, 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). Both parts of 2332b(g)(5) must be satisfied for the enhancement to apply. See United States v. Tankersley , 537 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Parr , 545 F.3d 491, 504 (7th Cir. 2008).
The material support statute, by contrast, requires proof that a defendant attempted to, conspired to, or did provide "material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization," knowing "that the organization is a designated terrorist organization" or "that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism." 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). It is possible for a defendant to provide material support to a terrorist group in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) without intending that the support or resources would influence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct to satisfy the first prong of the definition of federal crime of terrorism. See, e.g. , United States v. Chandia (Chandia I ), 514 F.3d 365, 376 (4th Cir. 2008).
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.