The following excerpt is from Canadian Council for Refugees v R, 2007 FC 1262 (CanLII), [2008] 3 FCR 606:
In S-K- at pages 18-19, the BIA first stated that it does not matter if there was intent to provide support: Nor do we understand the decision in Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, supra, to require a showing of an intent on the part of a provider of material support to further a particular admission-barring or asylum-barring goal of a terrorist organization. Rather, the statute is clearly drafted in this respect to require only that the provider afford material support to a terrorist organization, with the sole exception being a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was of that character. Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd) of the Act. We thus reject the respondent's assertion that there must be a link between the provision of material support to a terrorist organization and the intended use by that recipient organization of the assistance to further a terrorist activity. Especially where assistance as fungible as money is concerned, such a link would not be in keeping with the purpose of the material support provision, as it would enable a terrorist organization to solicit funds for an ostensibly benign purpose, and then transfer other equivalent funds in its possession to promote its terrorist activities.
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