California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Twiggs v. Superior Court, 194 Cal.Rptr. 152, 34 Cal.3d 360, 667 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1983):
First, the language in footnote 10 of Eleazer merely illustrates that what constitutes reasonable efforts will vary depending on the circumstances of each case. The suggested alternative obligations were premised on the presumption that a person who maintains stability in his place of residence and employment, and who has no motive to conceal his whereabouts, can likely be subpoened when the defense merely obtains the person's address and telephone number. But where it is likely that the informant cannot be located by merely providing the last known address, the trial court is under an obligation to ascertain whether the prosecution has more information and whether it has made reasonable efforts to obtain information useful in locating[34 Cal.3d 367] the informant. This obligation is necessarily required to implement the mandate of our decision in Eleazer, which "recognized the futility of a rule requiring disclosure of the information which the police know about a material witness informer without a further requirement that the police make efforts to obtain information useful in locating the informer as well." (People v. Goliday (1973) 8 Cal.3d 771, 778, 106 Cal.Rptr. 113, 505 P.2d 537.) Fairness to the accused requires that the prosecution bear the burden of showing that it has made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with the informant.
[667 P.2d 1169]
Page 156
2. Prosecutorial vindictiveness.
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