What is the test for establishing the corpus delicti of a felony murder?

"Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact." (Evid. Code, 411; see People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1030-1031.) J.B.'s testimony was sufficient proof of defendant's participation in the felony murder. It shows that defendant went to the dealership for the purpose of committing a robbery; that he participated in "stripping," or robbing, the victim; and that his participation was neither accidental nor merely negligent.

Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient because J.B. was not credible. However, "it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)

Defendant also argues that J.B. was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. Specifically, he claims that J.B. was an accessory after the fact because he did not immediately tell the police about defendant's admissions. The argument fails because an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice. ( 32, 33; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1227.)

Defendant claims the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the murder independent of his admissions to J.B. He relies on this court's opinion in People v. Parker (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 867, in which the crime was assisting an inmate to escape from jail. The inmate was a trustee who "needed no assistance to escape." (Id. at p. 873.) Although there was abundant evidence that he had, in fact, escaped, no evidence other than the defendant's admission suggested that the inmate had received any assistance. (Id. at pp. 873-874.)

Here, in contrast, there was abundantand undisputedindependent evidence that the felony murder had been committed. Defendant's identity as a participant in the crime was not a part of the corpus delicti; it could be proved by his words alone. (People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 296.)

B. Special Circumstances