What is the test for establishing a cause of action under the New York City Fire and Rescue Code?

On this appeal the plaintiffs argue that the decision below is inconsistent with the holding in Daggett v. Keshner, 284 App.Div. 733, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524, judgment affd. on subsequent appeal 6 A.D.2d 503, 179 N.Y.S.2d 428, affd. 7 N.Y.2d 981, 199 N.Y.S.2d 41, 166 N.E.2d 324.

In Daggett the owner of a gasoline station was held liable for injuries sustained in an arson when he sold gasoline to arsonists in violation of several code provisions. There it was noted that the section of the code imposing civil liability for violations causing injury, relieved the plaintiff of the traditional common-law burden of establishing proximate cause. Thus the fact that the intervening acts of the arsonists might be viewed as the proximate cause of the injury would not defeat the statutory cause of action if the plaintiff could demonstrate a practical or reasonable causal connection between the violation and the injuries ( Daggett v. Keshner, 284 App.Div. 733, 738, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524, supra ). The court cautioned, however, that a cause of action could not be maintained for a mere technical violation of the statute which is not pragmatically related to the injuries sustained ( id., at 740, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524).