California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Russell B. (In re Russell B.), G044843 (Cal. App. 2012):
'""In general, an 'independent' intervening cause will absolve a defendant of criminal liability. [Citation.] However, in order to be 'independent' the intervening cause must be 'unforeseeable . . . an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding cause.' [Citation.] On the other hand, a 'dependent' intervening cause will not relieve the defendant of criminal liability. '. . . If an intervening cause is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of defendant's original act the intervening act is "dependent" and not a superseding cause, and will not relieve defendant of liability.'"' [Citations.] '"[W]here [an] injury was brought about by a later cause of independent origin . . . [the question of proximate cause] revolves around a determination of whether the later cause of independent origin, commonly referred to as an intervening cause, was foreseeable by the defendant or, if not foreseeable, whether it caused injury of a type which was foreseeable. If either of these questions is answered in the affirmative, then the defendant is not relieved from liability towards the plaintiff; if, however, it is determined that the intervening cause was not foreseeable and that the results which it caused were not foreseeable, then the intervening cause becomes a supervening cause and the defendant is relieved from liability for the plaintiff's injuries."' [Citation.] Thus, '[t]he defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act.' [Citations.]" (People v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1325-1326.)
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