What is the test for determining whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty under Rule 11 of the Criminal Code?

At the plea proceeding, the court questioned Re about both his psychiatric treatment and his medication, as well as the effect of those medications on defendant's mental state, precisely as required by Rule 11. See United States v. Rossillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988). The defendant's responses to the district court's questioning at the hearing were not such as to undermine the court's finding that he was competent. See United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986) ("It is well-established that some degree of mental illness cannot be equated with incompetence to stand trial."). Re stated that the medications he was on "[s]ometimes . . . make things more clear," Plea Tr. at 4:13 (emphasis added), and affirmed that he could "understand what's being said clearly," id. at 5:9-10. The court also inquired of the two

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attorneys defending Re, and they informed the court that they had communicated extensively with Re and believed that defendant was capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings and was competent to plead guilty, which "provides substantial evidence of the defendant's competence." Vamos, 797 F.2d at 1150. In light of these circumstances and the district court's thorough questioning of the defendant, we see no plain error in failing to do more. See United States v. Andrades, 169 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A district court is not required to follow any particular formula in determining that defendant understands the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty."). Defendant, moreover, "has not demonstrated any reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty, or that the judge would not have accepted his plea, if the district court had inquired [further] about his medical condition or medications," Adams, 768 F.3d at 223, because he has "not link[ed] [his] mental illness" dissociative identity disorder "to [his] competency to stand trial," Vamos, 797 F.2d at 1151.

In addition to his Rule 11 claim, Re argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by permitting him to plead guilty without adequately ensuring that Re was competent to enter the guilty plea. "To allege a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim a defendant must show that: (1) counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient under prevailing professional standards, and, (2) but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different." United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 716 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984)). Because, as discussed above, Re has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the judge would not have accepted his plea if his counsel had further inquired into his mental state, Re cannot establish that his counsel was ineffective.

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