In what circumstances will the courts rely on the competence or expertise of the New York State Administrative Agency to determine whether a person has been found to have committed a criminal offence under the Criminal Code Act?

By contrast, where "the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the administrative agency" (Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d, at 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 403 N.E.2d 159, supra ). In such circumstances, the judiciary need not accord any deference to the agency's determination, and is free to ascertain the proper interpretation from the statutory language and legislative intent (Matter of Van Teslaar [Levine], 35 N.Y.2d, at 318, 361 N.Y.S.2d 338, 319 N.E.2d 702, supra; see also Matter of Ferrara [Catherwood], 10 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11, 176 N.E.2d 43).