What is the test for admitting a statement made by a defendant during his arrest but before receiving the warnings against self-incrimination required by Miranda?

After his arrest but before receiving the warnings against self-incrimination required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, defendant made a brief statement in which he said he had been asleep for the previous hour and one-half, he had just gotten out of jail, and he had not had sexual relations since his release. The prosecution sought to introduce this statement during its cross-examination of defendant. Defendant objected, claiming the statement was irrelevant, but the trial court ruled the statement was relevant to defendant's credibility.

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have excluded the statement because it was obtained in violation of Miranda. Because defendant did not object on this ground in the trial court, he may not now raise this issue. (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 853-854, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983.) Defendant's contention that the court should have instructed the jury that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be considered only for impeachment also fails, because the court made no finding that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda.

Defendant contends the trial court should have sustained his objection on the ground of relevance. Not so. His false account of his actions at the time of the killing was relevant to whether his trial testimony about those actions was truthful. Defendant asserts that certain truthful

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portions of the statement (his explanation that he had just been released from jail and had not recently had sexual relations) were irrelevant and prejudicial and should not have been admitted. Defendant failed to object on this ground in the trial court and thus may not do so here. (People v. Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 826, 853-854, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983.)

[110 Cal.Rptr.2d 481]