What is the test for abuse of discretion in a motion to dismiss a prior serious or violent felony conviction?

We review the trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss a prior serious or violent felony conviction under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550; see People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th

Page 13

367, 375 ["a trial court's refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of discretion"]; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 837 ["[t]he court's ruling on a motion to strike is subject to a deferential abuse of discretion standard of review"].) "'"[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary."'" (People v. Carmony, at p. 376.) "[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court's power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper. [] . . . [] . . . '[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more' prior conviction allegations. . . . Because the circumstances must be 'extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack' [citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary." (Id. at p. 378.)

Page 14

3. There Was No Abuse of Discretion