What is the test for a motion to suppress or suppress evidence in a civil case?

The relevance of the evidence is not alone determinative of its admissibility, however. Defense counsel, in his motion to suppress, argued that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. "He thereby specifically invoked the discretion vested in the court by Evidence Code section 352 to exclude relevant evidence 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice....' " (People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 24, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) "[O]n a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value...." (Id., at p. 25, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Admission of evidence "without making an explicit determination that this risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence" is error. (Id., at p. 26, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.)

The court's statement here does not meet the Green standard for such an explicit determination. Green relied upon our cases in People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892 (in which the trial court stated that although evidence might tend to be prejudicial, " 'it is material and will go in on that basis' " (id., at p. 801, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892, italics deleted)), and [41 Cal.3d 528] People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 44 Cal.Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142 (in which the trial court stated, " 'Well, I viewed [the film] and I feel that while it is not pleasant to look at it is a legal exhibit and it is material for the purposes offered' " (id., at p. 798, 44 Cal.Rptr.

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