What is the test for a motion to suppress a search warrant for an alleged criminal informer?

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Though we need not defer to the district court's conclusion in this case, we accord "great deference" to the issuing judge's determination of probable cause, id. at 236, and are instructed to resolve "doubtful or marginal cases" in harmony with the "preference to be accorded to warrants," Smith, 9 F.3d at 1012 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).

Given the totality of the circumstances and considering the deference we give to the issuing judge, the district court was correct to deny the motion to suppress. It is true that "a criminal informer is less reliable than an innocent bystander with no apparent motive to falsify," United States v. Gagnon, 373 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted), so Raymond's reliability may be undermined by the fact that he was incarcerated at the time of his interview. But we have also explained that "a face-to-face informant must . . . be thought more reliable than an anonymous telephone tipster, for the former runs the greater risk that he may be held accountable if his information proves false." Id. (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). While Raymond's reliability may be undermined by his criminality, it is bolstered

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