What is the standard of review when questioning whether a defendant received effective representation?

The standard of review when questioning whether a defendant received effective representation is well established. "In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his or her counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of such deficient performance. [Citation.] To demonstrate deficient performance, defendant bears the burden of showing that counsel's performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.' [Citation.] To demonstrate prejudice, defendant bears the burden of showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.)

Polston argues, in essence, that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to retain a medical expert before allowing Polston to accept the plea offer. Polston has not cited any authority which supports this proposition. Indeed, such a rule would have a significant chilling effect on plea bargaining; the proposition would prevent plea bargaining until defense counsel had completed trial preparation. All attempts to resolve cases through plea bargaining at an early stage of the proceedings would have to be rejected, oftentimes resulting in defendants missing out on favorable dispositions. If such a rule existed, it would defeat the salutary purposes of plea bargaining. (See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 361-362 [plea bargaining important

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component of criminal justice system that can benefit all concerned]; People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929 [plea agreements essential to expeditious and fair administration of court and promote speed, economy, and finality of judgments].)