The following excerpt is from United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2017):
It is only "[i]n a narrow range of cases," however, "when the statute at issue is divisible," that a court "may employ" the modified categorical approach to look at the underlying documents of conviction.4 Ramirez v. Lynch , 810 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016). Where a "statutory phrase ... refers to multiple, alternative means of commission" of the crime, it must "be regarded as indivisible if the jurors need not agree on which method of committing the offense the defendant used." Rendon , 764 F.3d at 1085.
[876 F.3d 1210]
Washington law is clear that jurors need not agree on whether a defendant is a principal or accomplice. See State v. Hoffman , 116 Wash.2d 51,804 P.2d 577, 605 (1991) ("[I]t is not necessary that jurors be unanimous as to the manner of an accomplice's and a principal's participation as long as all agree that they did participate in the crime."). Because a jury need not distinguish between principals and accomplices, the drug trafficking statute is not divisible so far as the distinction between those roles is concerned, so the modified categorical approach may not be applied, and it was error for the district court to do so.5
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