What is the effect of the delay between the arrest and trial of John Favors on his right to a speedy trial?

In this case we are concerned only with Favors' right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 1967, 386 U. S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1. Arizona also guarantees a speedy trial, Ariz.Const. Art. 2, 24, A.R.S. But it is the Arizona courts, not the federal courts, that are to construe and apply that guarantee.

Favors does not contend, nor could he, that the delay between his arrest on October 1, 1964, or his being held to answer on October 6, and his trial violated his right to a speedy trial. See, Barker v. Wingo, 1972, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. Rather, he argues that his federal right to a speedy trial attached when the complaint was filed on June 14, 1963, and that the delay thereafter violated that right.