What is the effect of section 781 of the California Criminal Code on a defendant's ability to establish a venue in his or her home state?

Evidently in order to avoid this conclusion, defendant proposes a considerably narrower construction of section 781. First, he reads section 781 as though it spoke only of "acts ... requisite to the consummation" of a crime establishing venue in a county, and not also of "effects," a word that proves crucial here. Second, defendant goes on to attempt to apply a gloss to "acts" in order to transform the reference into "acts deliberately targeting a county or its residents." Defendant argues

[8 Cal.Rptr.3d 572]

that without such a gloss, section 781 would fail to achieve the object of venue provisions from the defendant's perspective, namely, to "provide for trial in a county that bears a reasonable relationship" to the crime in question and thereby "restrict[] ... the discretion of the prosecution to file charges in any locale within the state that it chooses, an option that, if available, would provide the prosecution with the considerable power to choose a setting that, for whatever reason, the prosecution views as favorable to its position or hostile or burdensome to the defendant's" (People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1095, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598). The gloss applied by defendant, however, inserts into section 781 something that is not present and that contracts venue rather than extends it. Indeed, absent from section 781 as from the general venue provision of section 777 and from other venue provisions as well (see, ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 563, fn. 7, 82 P.3d pp. 765-766, fn. 7) is a requirement that the defendant possess any mental state whatever with respect to a county, for purposes of venue. The requirement of "effects" in a county "requisite to the consummation" of a crime satisfies the need for a reasonable relationship between the crime and the county and, as a result, restricts the People's charging discretion within tolerable bounds. Moreover, the gloss applied by defendant would purchase freedom from manipulation of venue by the People at the cost of allowing similar manipulation by the defendant, who then could choose only a favorable county, or only the residents of a favorable county, for his or her criminal activity.

[8 Cal.Rptr.3d 572]

After independent review, we also conclude that the trial court's instructions on venue did not effectively direct a finding adverse to defendant by removing the issue from the jury's consideration. The trial court's instructions, as already discussed, correctly informed the jury on the matter of venue and on the pertinent burden and standard of proof, and the aspects of the instructions challenged by defendant amounted merely to pinpoint instructions properly "relating particular facts to ... [the] issue" of venue (People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190, 84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847).