What is the difference between general and specific intent in determining the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication?

Although we noted in Hood that specific and general intent have been notoriously difficult terms to define and apply, we set forth a general definition distinguishing the two intents: "When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent." (Hood supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618,

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462 P.2d 370.) The basic framework that Hood established in designating a criminal intent as either specific or general for purposes of determining the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication has survived. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1128, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735.)

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