What is the difference between the mental state required for a conviction of a specific intent crime and that of those convicted of a general intent crime?

The higher mental state required for a conviction of a specific intent crime is "a distinction that is meaningful" in determining whether that defendant is similarly situated to a defendant convicted of a general intent crime. (See People v. Cavallaro (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 103, 114 [discussing equal protection related to 288 and 261.5].) Accordingly, because section 288 contains a specific intent requirement, defendant is not similarly situated to offenders convicted under either section 288a(d)(2) or 286(d)(2), neither of which contains a specific intent requirement. (See People v. Singh (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 364, 371 [a 288, subd. (a) offender "is not similarly situated to offenders convicted under section 261.5 . . . because [the latter] provision[] . . . [is a] general intent offense[]"]; see also People v. Alvarado (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 72, 79 [ 288, subd. (a) offenders are not similarly situated to 261.5 offenders because "[a] section 261.5 offense . . . concerns the general intent offense of committing unlawful sexual intercourse"].)