What is the current state of the law on the Miranda rights?

Defendant contends the interrogating police officers failed to honor several invocations of his right to remain silent and a single request for counsel. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.) "Under Miranda and its progeny, 'a suspect [may] not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel.' [Citation.] If at any point in the interview the suspect invokes the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, 'the interrogation must cease.' [Citations.] But, as the high court has stated, an officer is not required to stop questioning a suspect when 'a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal.' " (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1104-1105.) "If an accused makes a statement concerning the right to counsel 'that is ambiguous or equivocal' or makes no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation [citation], or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights . . . ." (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381.)

The same standard applies to the right to remain silent. (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381.) "There is good reason to require an accused who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unambiguously. A requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that 'avoid[s] difficulties of proof and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers' on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity. [Citation.] If an ambiguous act, omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face the consequence of suppression 'if they guess wrong.' [Citation.] Suppression of a voluntary confession in these circumstances would place a significant burden on society's interest in prosecuting criminal activity." (Id. at pp. 381-382.)

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"In reviewing a trial court's Miranda ruling, we accept the court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence, and we independently determine, from the undisputed facts and facts properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained. [Citation.] Because what defendant here said during his police interview is undisputed, we engage in a de novo review of the legal question of whether the statement at issue was ambiguous or equivocal." (People v. Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1105.)