What is the current state of the law on the Miranda rights?

"[W]hen an individual is taken into custody . . . [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 478-479.)

"If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474, fn. omitted.)

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Under Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, "when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. . . . [He] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." (Id. at pp. 484-485, fn. omitted.)

"The Edwards rule is 'designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,' [citation]. It does this by presuming his postassertion statements to be involuntary, 'even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.' [Citation.]" (Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) 556 U.S. 778, 787.)

"'An accused "initiates"' further communication[] when his words or conduct 'can be "fairly said to represent a desire" on his part "to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation."' [Citations.]" (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 656; see also Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 [plur. opn.].)

"'In the event he does in fact "initiate"' such further communication, exchanges, or conversations, 'the police may commence interrogation if he validly waives his [Miranda] rights.' [Citations.]" (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 727-728.) "If instead the police reinitiate discussion without a break in custody, any further statements

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by the defendant are presumed involuntary and rendered inadmissible. [Citations.]" (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 384-385.)

"When reviewing a Miranda ruling, 'we accept the trial court's determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.' [Citations.]" (People v. Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 633.) "The finding of 'initiation' in and of itself is 'reviewed for substantial evidence' as the resolution of a 'mixed question' of law and fact that is 'predominantly factual.' [Citation.]" (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 731.)