What is the current state of the law on permissive inference in a witness statement?

Blalock maintains that under Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157, 165 [99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777], "a permissive inference instruction violates a defendant's right to due process of law unless there is a rational connection between the underlying fact and the desired inference, and unless it can be said `with substantial assurance' that the latter is `more likely than not to flow from' the former." No due process violation occurred in this case.

In People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th 130, the defense similarly argued "the [flight] instruction creates an unconstitutional permissive inference because it cannot be said with `"substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 179.) Addressing the "more likely than not" standard, Mendoza concluded the various due process descriptions, such as "`rational connection,'" "`more likely than not,'" and "`reasonable doubt,'" "differ in language, [but] not substance." (Id. at p. 180.) Rather, a permissive inference violates due process "only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury" and permitting "a jury to infer, if it so chooses, that the flight of a defendant immediately after the commission of a crime indicates a consciousness of guilt" does not violate due process. (Id. at p. 180.)