What is the current state of the law on "flight instruction" for a defendant who fled the scene of the crime as a result of consciousness of guilt?

First, there is no doubt that the record of the proceedings at trial includes evidence from which it could be inferred that petitioner did flee the scene of the incident as a result of consciousness of guilt. (See, e.g., 1 RT 213; 2 RT 275, 313, 315, 318-19, 359-62, 370-72, 380-82, 452-54.) There is also evidence offered by the defense from which it could be inferred that petitioner left the scene as a result of fear. (3 RT 732-805 [petitioner's trial testimony].) Because both positions could be inferred from the evidence presented at trial, it was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury with CALCRIM 372. This was an issue for the jury to decide. The trial court informed the jury that: "it was up to [them] to decide [the] meaning and importance" of any attempt to flee or flight immediately after the crime was committed; and, further, evidence of attempted fleeing or flight "cannot prove guilt by itself." (3 RT 853-54.) Certainly, CALCRIM 372 did not instruct the jury to ignore petitioner's explanation for his flight. As a result of this cautionary language, the instructions themselves forbade the jury from drawing irrational inferences based on petitioner's flight. See Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (flight instruction could have worked to the defendant's benefit because it clarified "that flight alone is insufficient to establish guilt").