The following excerpt is from Castellanos v. United States, 438 F.Supp.3d 1120 (S.D. Cal. 2020):
But the differences beg the question, however, as to whether they fundamentally differ from the standard law enforcement contact in which an individual is subject to physical force, detained, or otherwise controlled. Both border enforcement and traditional law enforcement are cabined by existing Constitutional standards. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-882, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (concluding that Border Patrol agents on roving patrols may perform reasonable Terry- stops and "question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.") Whatever physical force to be employed must be reasonable under the circumstances. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S 194, 207, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ("Excessive force claims, like most other Fourth Amendment issues, are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the information officers had when the conduct occurred.") Standard border detention in secondary at the international border will no more excuse or justify excessive force than a traditional arrest for drunk driving or any other criminal wrongdoing. Whereas the search of a vehicle may be performed at the border without reasonable suspicion, it may not be conducted in a destructive manner. If reasonable suspicion exists for an intrusive vehicle search then greater measures, even destructive in nature, may be utilized either at the border or in traditional law enforcement. But the consistent standard for all of these applications of force, whether at the
[438 F.Supp.3d 1130]
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