The following excerpt is from Raniola v. Police Comm'r Bratton, 243 F.3d 610 (2nd Cir. 2000):
proof that the other adverse treatment that was not explicitly sex-based was, nevertheless, suffered on account of sex. The presentation of this circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent would normally follow the burden-shifting framework familiar to Title VII cases, under which, even if the plaintiff succeeds in presenting a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant may rebut that presumption by articulating a legitimate, non discriminatory reason for the employment action, see Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981), causing the presumption to "simply drop[] out of the picture." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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