What evidence is considered in evaluating whether a question posed to a witness before a congressional committee is pertinent to an investigation's inquiry?

²¹ The majority's support for this conclusion derives solely from cases discussing, in the contempt prosecution context, what evidence may be considered in evaluating whether a question posed to a witness before a congressional committee was pertinent to an investigation's inquiry. See Watkins , 354 U.S. at 20102, 77 S.Ct. 1173 ; Rumely , 345 U.S. at 48, 73 S.Ct. 543 ; Shelton v. United States , 327 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; see also Maj. Op. at 65456. This issue is distinct from the threshold question of whether a committee is adequately authorized, so that the majority must necessarily reason by analogy, and its conclusion is far from inevitable, particularly in the context of third-party subpoenas aimed at a President's personal information, where the President must be able efficiently (and without undue distraction) to determine what, if any, steps she should take, either to assist the inquiry or, as here, to litigate. I need not address this question, however, because, even assuming that Resolution 507 is properly considered, a serious question remains as to whether it constitutes what the majority acknowledges is required: "sufficient evidence of legislative authorization and purposes to enable meaningful judicial review." Maj. Op. at 654.