What constitutes a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment?

first three actions constitutes "a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment" because such actions "must be more disruptive than a mere convenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). As to the fourth action, Weeks alleges no facts supporting her conclusory assertion that she was "demoted," such as her having received "a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices unique to a particular situation." Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Weeks did not allege that she suffered a materially adverse employment action, the district court properly dismissed her Title VII and NYSHRL discrimination claims.³

"Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily." Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] constructive discharge cannot be proven merely by evidence that an employee disagreed with the employer's criticisms of the quality of [her] work, or did not receive a raise, or preferred not to continue working for that employer. Nor is the test merely whether the employee's working conditions were difficult or unpleasant."

Page 5

Spence v. Md. Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993). Rather, a "plaintiff may prove a constructive discharge by establishing that [her] 'employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately made [her] working conditions so intolerable that [s]he was forced into an involuntary resignation,' i.e., 'so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign.'" Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal alteration omitted)).