What are the implications of the federal court's "conscious avoidance" instructions on the failure to file return and the conspiracy counts?

First, Little challenges the "conscious avoidance" instructions on the failure to file return counts, the failure to file FBAR count, and the conspiracy count; and second, that the district court's instructions as to willfulness erroneously converted the standard into a reasonableness standard. Conscious avoidance instructions are permissible only when the defendant mounts a defense that he lacked "some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction" and "a rational juror may reach the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact." United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, each predicate is met: Little defended himself by claiming ignorance of his obligations under the Tax Code and, because of Little's legal education and the relative straightforwardness of his obligations, a reasonable juror could conclude that Little was aware of a high probability that his actions were unlawful.