What is the scope of the power of the Court of Appeal's stare decisis?

As I understand the result in the light of the doctrine of stare decisis, the power has been conclusively held not to extend to delay whatever the cause, nor to circumstances which might otherwise be thought to be oppressive to an accused. Beyond that, in my view the limitations on the scope of the power must be determined pragmatically as in The Queen v. Osborn and Rourke v. The Queen, and it is only when the circumstances are held to be within the scope that the highly restricted discretion can be considered.

For the reasons given by my brother Morrow I am of opinion that the holding of a public inquiry is not a consideration that falls within the power to stay a subsequent prosecution. Oppression of the nature asserted in The Queen v. Osborn is not open to consideration, and in any event I can see none in a relevant sense in the present case. Publicity is inherent and an important aspect of a public inquiry, not an exceptional circumstance. Whether it is in fact seriously prejudicial to the defence is not a matter that can be determined in advance of the trial and certainly the power does not extend to a speculation of abuse.

My difference with my brother Morrow is only to the extent above recorded in respect of the conclusion he has reached on the ratio decidendi of Rourke v. The Queen. In all other respects I am in agreement and I concur in the dismissal of the appeal. Dated at Edmonton, Alberta, this 14th day of September, 1977.