What is the interpretative principle to apply to the statutory leave test?

As regards the general interpretative principle to be applied to the statutory leave test, I respectfully adopt the comments of van Rensburg J. in Silver v. Imax (Leave) at paras. 293 to 294, to the effect that the legislation is remedial and that it should be interpreted to facilitate access to the courts by shareholders with legitimate claims: The statutory cause of action for secondary market misrepresentation also serves a dual purpose, of permitting the recovery of damages by a shareholder, and as a deterrent to breach of a reporting issuer's continuous disclosure obligations under the OSA. Similarly, the statutory cause of action was introduced as remedial legislation; that is, in recognition of the obstacles to pursuing claims for secondary market misrepresentation under common law. Accordingly, the leave test prescribed by the legislature should be interpreted so as to permit access to the courts by shareholders with legitimate claims.