Does the principle of corporate separateness override the equitable principles of equitable principles in the context of vicarious liability?

Further, the decision in Bazley v. Curry, 1999 CanLII 692 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 also tends to support the concept that equitable principles may be relied upon to override the principle of corporate separateness where it is necessary to do justice. Indeed, it seems difficult to see a legal foundation for the imposition of vicarious liability, other than a foundation in equity. I note that in Bazley, McLachlin J. expressly based the imposition of vicarious liability on two policy considerations, the first of which was to provide “a just and practical remedy to people who suffer as a consequence of wrongs perpetrated by an employee.” Transferred into this context, a party, who holds a valid judgment, has, by definition, been found to have suffered a wrong. I can conceive of situations, albeit rare ones, where piercing the corporate veil for enforcement purposes would be necessary in order to provide a “just and practical remedy” to a person who holds a valid judgment, especially in the context of related corporations.