As earlier stated, the question is whether or not ss. 487.04 to 487.09 constitute a reasonable balance between the rights of the accused as mandated by s. 8 and the right of the state to intrude upon him in discharging its law enforcement responsibility. Mr. Justice Dickson in Hunter v. Southam Inc. when discussing these competing interests, had this to say at p. 373 C.R.R., pp. 114-15 C.C.C.: The common law required evidence on oath which gave “strong reason to believe” that stolen goods were concealed in the place to be searched before a warrant would issue. Section 443 of the Criminal Code authorizes a warrant only where there has been information upon oath that there is “reasonable ground to believe” that there is evidence of an offence in the place to be searched. … History has confirmed the appropriateness of this requirement as the threshold for subordinating the expectation of privacy to the needs of law enforcement. Where the state’s interest is not simply law enforcement as, for instance, where state security is involved, or where the individual’s interest is not simply his expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant standard might well be a different one.
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