What is the onus of proof under section 810 of the Criminal Code?

In Miller v. Miller (1991), 87 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 250 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.) Handrigan P.C.J. explored at length the onus of proof. His conclusion was at para. 23: “It is my view that the burden of proof on the prosecution on a section 810 application is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt but on a balance of probabilities. The following are my reasons for concluding this: (1) Proceedings under section 810 are at best quasi-criminal in nature and even where there is a finding that the accused is required to enter into a recognizance this is not a conviction and no penalty flows directly there from. (2) The wording of section 810 of the Criminal Code is to the effect that an application can be taken out by any person ‘who fears’, and that the court must be satisfied on the evidence adduced that the applicant has ‘reasonable grounds for his fears.’ The use of the words ‘fears’, ‘satisfied’, and ‘reasonable grounds’ do not suggest the same severity or significant degree of proof attendant upon the prosecution in bona fide criminal proceedings. (3) While it may be argued that a respondent entering into a recognizance has his liberty restricted, or that a very real consequence will result to those directed to but who refuse to enter into a recognizance, essentially the existence of a recognizance is no penalty or burden for a respondent to bear, simply because he is only binding himself to do what all law-abiding citizens are required to do. It is true that he attracts the risks of further penalty for breaching the peace or failing to be of good behaviour but this is not such an unreasonable burden or expectation for him, such that his exposure to it should be supportable only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (4) The recognizance contemplated by section 810 of the Criminal Code may be in form 32 of the Criminal Code and this is the type of form suggested as being the form of a recognizance to be entered into by a person released by the court under the judicial interim release provisions of the Criminal Code. It is a will-established fact that the burden on the applicant under the judicial interim release provisions is not beyond a reasonable doubt but on a balance of probabilities. Hence, it would follow a fortiori that the burden contemplated by section 810 of the Criminal Code is on the same standard, proof on a balance of probabilities.”