What is the standard of reasonableness in the context of a judicial review?

As to the standard of reasonableness, the Ontario Court of Justice referred to a passage from Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: . . . certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions . . . In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

Although s. 81(1) of the Act entitles an elector who “believes on reasonable grounds that a candidate has contravened a provision of this Act relating to election campaign finances” to apply for a compliance audit, the Ontario Court of Justice held, at para. 18, that the subjective belief of the elector “applies only to the commencement of this process” and that the test to be used by the Committee “was whether the Committee believed on reasonable grounds that a candidate had contravened” the Act. In doing so, the court relied upon this passage from Lyras v. Heaps, [2008] O.J. No. 4243 (O.C.J.), at para. 23: . . . even if the appellant [elector] had what he considered reasonable grounds to ask for an audit, the Committee has considerably more information at their disposal. Having heard all the submissions and reviewed all the material before them, the Committee is in a better position than the appellant to determine whether, in fact, ‘reasonable grounds’ do exist to proceed with an audit. It is the role of the Committee to weigh the evidence and to make determinations of what weight should be accorded to the representations before it.

In defining “reasonable grounds,” the Ontario Court of Justice again cited Lyras v. Heaps, supra, at para. 25: . . . the standard to be applied is that of an objective belief based on compelling and credible information which raises the ‘reasonable probability’ of a breach of the statute. The standard of ‘a prima facie case’ in either its permissive or presumptive sense is too high a standard.