What is the standard of care of an orthopaedic surgeon?

The appellant concedes that he owes a duty of care to the respondent. Regarding the standard of care, the appellant submits that the standard of care which the appellant must meet is that of an ordinary orthopaedic surgeon and says that such a standard is established by the expert evidence as to the standards of other competent orthopaedic surgeons. The appellant relies on the decision of Sopinka J. in ter Neuzen v. Korn [1995] 3 S.C.R. 693. As to standard of care, Sopinka J stated at p. 693: It is settled that physicians have a duty of care to conduct their practice in accordance with the conduct of a prudent and diligent doctor in the same circumstances. In the case of a specialist... the doctor’s behaviour must be assessed in the light of the conduct of other ordinary specialists, who possess a reasonable level of knowledge, competence and skill, expected of professionals in Canada, in that field. A specialist..who holds himself out as possessing a special degree of skill and knowledge must exercise the degree of skill of an average specialist in the field. And at p. 696: It is evident from the foregoing passage, that while conformity with common practise will generally exonerate physicians of any complaint of negligence, there are certain situations where the standard practise in itself may be found to be negligent. However, this will only be where the standard practise is “fraught with obvious risks” such that anyone is capable of finding it negligent, without the necessity of judging matters requiring diagnostic or clinical expertise.... As was observed in Lapointe, courts should not involve themselves in resolving scientific disputes which require the expertise of the profession. Courts and juries do not have the necessary expertise to assess technical matters relating to the diagnosis or treatment of patients. Where a common and accepted course of conduct is adopted based on the specialized and technical expertise of professionals, it is unsatisfactory for a finder of fact to conclude that such a standard was inherently negligent. On the other hand, matters falling within the ordinary common sense of juries can be judged to be negligent. For example, where there are obvious existing alternatives which any reasonable person would utilize in order to avoid a risk, one could conclude that the failure to adopt such measures is negligent notwithstanding that it is the prevailing practise among physicians in that area.