How have the courts considered the credibility of an alleged torture victim in their disclosure rulings?

In a somewhat different context, R.F. Goldstein J. drew the following conclusions, in his disclosure ruling (Attorney General of Canada v. Iusein), at para. 32, about the credibility of the applicant in relation to his allegations of torture: The … problem is simply that [the applicant] never raised these torture allegations, despite opportunities to do so. In fairness, I am aware that it may well be difficult for torture victims to relate their stories. I am also aware that it may be particularly difficult in cases of sexual violence. I am mindful that [the applicant] did mention that he was beaten during the cross-examination on his original bail hearing. The basic problem, however, is that he had a positive duty to disclose his conviction. He could have done that, and made the allegation of torture at that time. He could have made the allegation of torture in his bail affidavit. He did not do so – in fact he positively affirmed that he was released from prison for health reasons related to hepatitis and ulcers. He said nothing about torture, which was the reason he gives in his current affidavit. His current detailed affidavit simply smacks of fabrication, given all of these other lies and misrepresentations. 3. Did the Romanian Prosecutor Rely Upon a Confession Extracted by Police Violence?