How have courts dealt with “well-grounded suspicion” in a Will?

Vout v. Hay, 1995 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876 at paras. 26 and 27, explains how “well-grounded suspicion” is properly addressed: “... The burden with respect to testamentary capacity will be affected as well if the circumstances reflect on the mental capacity of the testator to make a will. Although the propounder of the will has the legal burden with respect to due execution, knowledge and approval, and testamentary capacity, the propounder is aided by a rebuttable presumption. Upon proof that the will was duly executed with the requisite formalities, after having been read over to or by a testator who appeared to understand it, it will generally be presumed that the testator knew and approved of the contents and had the necessary testamentary capacity. Where suspicious circumstances are present, then the presumption is spent and the propounder of the will reassumes the legal burden of proving knowledge and approval. In addition, if the suspicious circumstances relate to mental capacity, the propounder of the will reassumes the legal burden of establishing testamentary capacity. Both of these issues must be proved in accordance with the civil standard. There is nothing mysterious about the role of suspicious circumstances in this respect. The presumption simply casts an evidentiary burden on those attacking the will. This burden can be satisfied by adducing or pointing to some evidence which, if accepted, would tend to negative knowledge and approval or testamentary capacity. In this event, the legal burden reverts to the propounder.”

At this stage of the proceedings, the evidentiary burden spoken of in Vout v. Hay on those attacking the will is met. The evidence in this case raises a genuine issue as to whether there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation of the will, sufficient to dictate that the proponent of the will assume at a trial the legal burden of establishing testamentary capacity.