What is the test for determining whether a coupling between a vehicle and a crane is a cause of damage to the vehicle?

However, it is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the separation of the coupling was not the cause of the damage. While it is conceded that the separation started the sequence of events, it is submitted that the proximate or real cause of the damage was the ditch coming into contact with the crane. In support of this proposition I have been referred to several decisions including Aable Cvane and Trucking Limited v. The Canadian Surety Company, [1979] I.L.R. 506. In that case two mounting bolts that fastened a crane to a truck body severed causing the crane to fall on the truck cab thereby damaging it. The trial judge held that the insurer was not liable as the cause of the damage was the mechanical failure of the bolts. This failure was the cause of the damage. There was no intervening force or proximate cause. However, at the end of the judgment the learned trial judge stated: The plaintiff's fears that mechanical failures to a vehicle, such as the dropping off of the wheel, would allow the insurer to avoid liability for damage to the vehicle is not, in my view, necessarily valid. If the wheel dropped off the vehicle because of a mechanical fracture or breakdown and then the vehicle carried on and ran into a wall, damaging the front end of the vehicle, I am sure it could be strongly argued that the damage to the front end resulted from an 'intervening' cause and something that was 'coincident' with other loss or damage' and that the insurer would be liable. However, it is not my responsibility in this case to make a determination on a hypothetical situation, but rather to deal with the specific facts as presented to me. It will be noted that the statement itself contains the disclaimer that the trial judge is not dealing with the hypothetical situation. In any event, with respect, I cannot agree with the suggestion contained in the statement if it was intended to state that the wall itself would be the cause of the damage. I am unable to accept the suggestion that the power of causation can be attributed to or found in an inanimate object which plays no role in the accident other than merely being present in its appropriate place. A contrary view would be a very marked departure from the traditional view of causation and, in my opinion, an unnecessary and unjustified departure from the traditional view. It does not seem reasonable that trees or ditches in themselves could be conceived as causes of accidents and attendant damage. Of course, the situation is different if inanimate objects are moved to an abnormal state by an intervening force such as an act of God or man, but then the intervening force is the cause.