What is the current state of the law on deference in human rights cases?

Greckol J. referred to Calgary (City) Electric System v. Weitmann (2001), 292 A.R. 295, 2001 ABQB 181 in support of her conclusion. In that case, Clark J. considered the question of deference in relation to findings of fact, noting that the need for curial deference in relation to fact finding arises not because human rights panels as primary finders of fact possess any peculiar ability in relation to finding facts but because, like all fact‑finding bodies that receive evidence in the first instance, tribunals are in a unique position to evaluate such factors as the credibility of a particular witness and the weight that should be assigned to specific evidence. Clark J. also noted that the general presumption of curial deference as applied to findings of fact is not categorical but must be approached with a principled flexibility, and that properly identifying the issue raised on appeal is necessary in order for a court to make an informed decision as to the proper standard to be applied, given that different questions require disparate levels of curial deference.