How have courts interpreted the meaning of words in a statute?

In Nanaimo-Ladysmith School No. 68 v. Dean (Litigation guardian of), 2015 BCSC 11, Fitzpatrick J. stated: 32 It is, of course, a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature intends all words in a provision to have meaning. When construing the meaning of words within the modern principle of statutory construction, words that are precise and unambiguous are to be understood in their grammatical and ordinary sense: Driedger at 2. Further, there is a rebuttable assumption that: Words should not be put into a statute unless they have a grammatical or substantive function. A reader of statutes, therefore, has the right to assume, at least as a starting point, that every word has meaning and function. (Driedger at 92 [emphasis already added]).