How have courts interpreted the meaning of the word “proceeding” in the context of the English Limitation Act?

The father relies upon Harkness v. Bell’s Asbestos Engineering, Ltd., [1966] 3 All E.R. 843, in which Lord Denning M.R. interpreted the meaning of “proceeding” in a recently amended provision of the English Limitation Act. In that case, the plaintiff applied by way of an affidavit for an order that the Limitation Act should not give rise to a defence to his proposed action for damages for personal injuries. An issue arose whether the filing of the affidavit constituted a proceeding. If it did, then another provision of the Limitation Act stated that a failure to comply with the rules therein would be treated as an irregularity and not a nullification of the proceedings. At p. 845, Denning M.R. stated: It is said that this [irregularity/nullification] rule does not cover this case ... [I]t is said that at the time of the registrar’s order, there were no “proceedings”; because no writ had been issued. So the rule, it was said, did not apply. I think that this is far too narrow an interpretation. This rule should be construed widely and generously to give effect to its manifest intentions. Any application to the court, however informal, is a “proceeding”. There were “proceedings” in being at the very moment that the plaintiff made his affidavit and his solicitor lodged it with the registrar. (my emphasis)