In MacKay v. MacDonald’s Restaurants supra, the plaintiff had argued that because the specific words in s-s.2(1)(d) included violence as a common or principal characteristic, the general words “or other injury to the person” should be restricted to cases where the negligent act caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries as the result of a direct application of force. As there was no such direct application of force in that case, he argued the limitation period provided for in s-s.2(1)(d) was not applicable. This was the argument MacDonald J. was responding to when he made the statement as to the desirability of having one limitation period for all actions framed in negligence. In his view it did not make sense to interpret the Statute of Limitations as providing for a separate limitation period of six years [s-s.2(1)(g)] when there is an indirect application of force and two years when there is a direct application of force. In the context of the case before him, where the plaintiff suffered an injury to his ankle as the result of a slip and fall in the defendant’s icy parking lot, I understand his reasoning.
"The most advanced legal research software ever built."
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.