The jurisdiction of the extradition judge is derived entirely from the statute and the relevant treaty. Pursuant to s. 3 of the Act, the statute must be interpreted as giving effect to the terms of the applicable treaty. La Forest J. writing for the majority in Re McVey, 1992 CanLII 48 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475 at 519 (S.C.C.), stated that “courts must find a statutory source for attributing a particular function to the extradition judge”, and that “courts should not reach out to bring within their jurisdictional ambit matters that the Act has not assigned to them.” In particular, it was held in Republic of Argentina v. Mellino, 1987 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 at p. 553, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 334, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 74 that: …absent express statutory or treaty authorization, the sole purpose of an extradition hearing is to ensure that the evidence establishes a prima facie case that the extradition crime has been committed. [Emphasis added].
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